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Abstract
The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the
result is compared to that emerging in the case of price-setting behaviour. It turns out that
quantity collusion is generally better sustained than price collusion, unless products are almost
perfect substitutes. Under both quantity and price competition, the social damage associated
with collusion is increasing in the degree of substitutability.
* Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Gianpaolo Rossini for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual
disclaimer applies.
# Please send correspondence to the Italian address.
1. Introduction
The issue of cartel stability has received wide attention in the recent oligopoly theory. In
this short note, I want to focus on the influence exerted by product differentiation on firms’
ability to collude. Within the address approach, this question has been tackled in several papers
(Chang, 1991; Jehiel, 1992; Ross, 1992 and Häckner, 1994). Within the non-address approach,
the main contributions are those of Deneckere (1983), Majerus (1988), Ross (1992) and finally
Rothschild (1992). Ross confines his attention to the interplay between product differentiation
and price collusion, showing that the critical discount rate is initially decreasing and then
increasing in the degree of substitutability between products. Deneckere, as well as Rothschild,
compares cartel stability under price and quantity competition, though resorting to different
models. The first author claims that collusion is better sustained in price setting games when
substitutability is high, while the reverse holds when substitutability is low; on the contrary, the
second author finds that a high degree of substitutability fosters collusion in quantity, and
viceversa. Finally, Majerus has shown that the latter result does not hold as the number of firms
increases. In the following pages, I am going to investigate collusive behaviour in a differentiated
quantity-setting duopoly adopting the same modelization as in Ross (1992). On the basis of my
own and Ross’ results it is possible to claim that quantity collusion is generally more stable than
price collusion, except when goods are very close substitutes. This conclusion is in sharp contrast
with Rothschild (1992) while it is partially in line with Deneckere (1983).
2. The model
The model I adopt relies on a quadratic utility function for the representative consumer,
as in Dixit (1979), Singh and Vives (1984) and Ross (1992). Individuals derive utility from the
consumption of two substitute goods, x1 and x2, and a numeraire y, according to
that, given py=1, yields the following inverse demand function for good i:
U = ax1 + ax2 −
1
2
(bx12 + 2dx1x2 + bx22) + y (1
1
The ratio measures the degree of exogenous differentiation between the two
goods. If r=0 they are completely independent, while if r=1 they are perfect substitutes. Both
firms produce at the same constant marginal cost c. Thus, the profit function of firm i is the
following:
from which firm i’s reaction function in the quantity space can be derived:
Solving (4), we obtain and as the optimal quantity
and equilibrium profit for firm i in the simultaneous noncooperative duopoly game.
Let us now focus on cartel behaviour. The objective of the cartel is to maximize joint
profits The generic first order condition is:
from which we can easily obtain firm i’s optimal collusive output and then
equilibrium profits
We are finally able to investigate firm i’s cheating behaviour, provided firm j sticks to the
collusive agreement. By substituting into (4) and solving for xi, we get
as firm i’s deviation output, while deviation profits are
pi = a − bxi − dxj, i , j = 1, 2, i ≠ j . (2
r = d /b ∈ [0, 1]
pii = (pi − c)xi, (3
∂pii
∂xi
= a − c − 2bxi − dxj = 0. (4
xi
N
= (a − c)/(2b + d ) piiN = b (a − c)2/(2b + d )2
ΠC = piiC + pijC.
∂ΠC
∂xi
= a − c − 2bxi − 2dxj = 0, (5
xi
C
= (a − c)/2(b + d )
pii
C
= (a − c)2/4(b + d ).
xj
C
= (a − c)/2(b + d )
xi
D
= (a − c) (2b + d )/4b (b + d )
2
Bynowwe arewell acquainted with thenotionof collusion stability inan infinitely repeated
game, so that I can confine myself to recall that the critical discount rate
provides a direct measure of cartel stability. Provided that the model is symmetric, index i can
be dropped. On the basis of the above calculations, the critical discount rate in the Cournot case
is the following:
which is equal to 1 when goods are completely independent (r=0), while it is equal to 8/9 when
there is perfect substitutability (r=1). Furthermore, it is easily checked that in the relevant range
of parameters both the first and the second derivatives of respect to r are non-positive, so
that the critical discount factor is decreasing and concave in the degree of substitutability.
The critical discount rate under Bertrand competition (Ross, 1992, pp.7-8) is defined as
follows:
The discontinuity in is due to the fact that for r>0.73 the model ovestates the gain from
cheating and violates the constraint that all quantities must be positive. When this constraint is
duly accounted for, the second expression in (8) obtains. Thus, under Bertrand behaviour cartel
stability initially decreases and then increases as product differentiation shrinks. A comparison
between (7) and (8) shows that quantity collusion is generally more stable than price collusion.
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(2 − r)2 (r 2 + r − 1) ∀r ∈ [0.73, 1]. (8
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Since when r=0.96155, the reverse is true only for i.e., when products
are very close substitutes.
As far as social welfare is concerned, Ross (1992, p.8-9) shows that under Bertrand
competition the ratio SWC/SWN decreases as r, i.e., the degree of substitutability, increases. Thus,
the larger is product differentiation the less harmful collusion will be. It can be quickly checked
that the same holds in the Cournot setting as well. Social welfare is defined as the sum of
consumer surplus and industry profits:
which in the two cases under consideration yields:
It is straightforward to verify that both SWN and SWC are decreasing and convex in r. Since the
same also holds for the ratio SWC/SWN, the above claim is thus proved.
3. Conclusions
I have investigated the issue of cartel stability in a quantity-setting duopoly where products
are characterized by an exogenous degree of substitutability. The comparison between my results
and those derived by Ross (1992) for a price-setting duopoly shows that collusion in quantities
is moreeasily sustained than collusion in prices for a wide range of parameters,while the opposite
holds only when the degree of substitutability between products is almost complete. This
conclusion differs completely with that reached by Rothschild (1992) while it confirms to a
certain extent that of Deneckere (1983). Finally, the level of social welfare associated with the
cartel increases as product differentiation increases, independently of whether firms set prices
or quantities.




J + CSJ, i = 1, 2; J = N , C , (9
SWN = (a − c)
2 (3 + r)
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